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The Prosecution of Rape Under
International Law: Justice That Is
Long Overdue
ABSTRACT

This Note argues that despite theoretical criticisms, the
prosecution of rape and sexual enslavement as crimes against
humanity,by the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) fits within a larger, emerging picture of
international legal jurisprudence. First, the ICTY built upon
both its own prior decisions and the decisions of the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor Rwanda (ICTR), especially
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, in order to close gaps in the
internationallegal conceptualizationsof rape and enslavement,
torture, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
Second, building upon the example set by the ICTR, the ICTY
broadened internationalprotections of civilians of either gender,
especially civilians of different ethnicities, from even
unsystematic acts of depravity. Third, it fully codified women
as legally equal to men in the human community, but it did not
unfairly single women out as a weaker gender in need of special
protections, nor did it establish a victimology for women in rape
cases. In other words, it brought women within the purview of
humanity for purposes of prosecuting crimes against humanity.
Finally, it established an historic foundation for the prosecution
of crimes against humanity by other courts and in other
locations, but did not infringe upon the sovereignty of either a
state or an individual.
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International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),
eight Bosnian Serb police and military officers raped and sexually
assaulted fourteen Bosnian Muslim women in the town of Foca, a

20021

THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW

1271

bucolic village in southeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina. 1 The eight
officers, all men, detained and enslaved the women in houses and
apartments that they maintained as brothels for paramilitary
troops.2 All of the women, including some girls as young as twelve
years old, were subjected to "almost constant rape, sexual assault,
and torture. ''3 The impact of these attacks was both psychologically
and physically devastating:
The physical and psychological health of many female detainees
seriously deteriorated as a result of these sexual assaults. Some of the
women endured complete exhaustion [and serious gynecological
harm].. . . Some of the sexually abused women became suicidal.
Others became indifferent as to what would happen to them and
suffered from depression. . . . All the women who were sexually
assaulted suffered psychological and emotional harm; some remain
4
traumatized.

The attacks on the Muslin women of Foca were part of a broader
campaign of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs to reduce the non5
Serb population in Serbian-claimed regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
To effectuate this policy, the Bosnian Serb leaders in charge of Foca
murdered most of the non-Serb men in the town and sent the
survivors to concentration camps. 6 The women, however, were not
killed immediately; rather, they were sent to rape camps like the one
described in the ICTY's indictment where they were forced to perform
sexual services for the Bosnian Serb soldiers. 7 Many of the women
8
were gang-raped and forced to live in a condition of sexual slavery.
Two women were even sold as chattel for DM 500 each. 9 Put simply,
these actions were "calculated, cynical, and subhuman," yet they were
also grimly effective.' 0
Before 1992, Foca's population of
approximately forty thousand was almost evenly divided between
Muslim and Serb ethnic groups. 11 As of 2002, however, Foca's

1.
Kate Nahapetian, Note, Selective Justice: Prosecuting Rape in the
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 14
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 126, 130 (1999).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. at 131.
.5.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A CLOSED DARK PLACE: PAST AND PRESENT HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES IN FOCA (July 1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/foca/.
6.
Id.
7.
Id.
8.
Id.
9.
Human Rights Watch, Bosnia: Landmark Verdicts for Rape, Torture, and
Sexual Enslavement (Feb. 22,
2001), at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/02/
serbia0222.htm.
10.
J. F. BROWN, HOPES AND SHADOWS: EASTERN EUROPE AFTER COMMUNISM
249 (1994).
11.
A CLOSED DARK PLACE: PAST AND PRESENT HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN
FOCA, supra note 5.
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population is approximately twenty-four thousand, and fewer than

12
one hundred non-Serbs live within its borders.
What happened in Foca is almost unthinkable, yet a similar
series of events occurred in Rwanda two years later. 13 Jean-Paul
Akayesu, an ethnic Hutu and the mayor of Taba, a small Rwandan
village, knowingly allowed the mass rape of hundreds of Tutsi women
in 1994, even though as mayor he controlled the police and could have
prevented the attacks. 14 Indeed, when Tutsi women sought refuge at
the village's communal center,

[they] were regularly taken by armed local militia and/or communal
police and subjected to sexual violence, and/or beaten on or near the
bureau communal premises .... Many women were forced to endure
multiple acts of sexual violence which were at times committed by more
than one assailant. These acts of sexual violence were generally
15
accompanied by explicit threats of death or bodily harm.

In 1998, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted Akayesu of genocide and crimes against
humanity for his encouragement of the rape of Tutsi women in
Rwanda, and the Appeals Chamber upheld that conviction in 2001.16
Akayesu's conviction was historic because it was the first time in
history that a defendant was tried and convicted by an international
tribunal for genocide. 17 Moreover, Akayesu's conviction paved the
way for later prosecutions of sexual crimes by international tribunals,
including the recent trial of some of the perpetrators of the events in
Foca. 18 Indeed, as Prosecutor Louise Arbour noted,
[t]he judgment [in Akayesu] is truly remarkable in its breadth and
vision, as well as in the detailed legal analysis on many issues that will
be critical to the future of both ICTR and ICTY, in particular with
respect to the law of sexual violence. The Court showed great
sensitivity to the difficulties of bringing forward the victims who are
required to reveal, often in public, the shocking indignities to which
they were subjected. 1 9

Although Akayesu generally was hailed as an historic judgment, it
was also criticized for being "abundant in facts but short on law and

12.
Id.
13.
See generally Sherrie L. Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2003) (copy on file with author) (discussing the
Rwandan situation, the Akayesu decision, and the implications of considering rape as
an act of genocide).
14.
Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in Decisions and Indictments of the
Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals: Current Status, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97, 106 (1999).
15.
Id.
16.

FOUNDATION HIRONDELLE, ICTR, APPEALS COURT CONFIRMS JUDGMENT ON

FORMER MAYOR (June 1, 2001), at http://www.hirondelle.org.
17.
Askin, supra note 14, at 105.
18.
Id. at 110.
19.
Press Release, ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, Statement by Justice Louise
Arbour, ICTY Doc. CC/PIU/342-E (Sept. 4, 1998).
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reasoning to support its determinations. 20
Consequently, its
conclusions about rape in international law were only tentative.
However, the Akayesu case represented an important first step in the
consideration of crimes involving rape under international law, and it
laid a foundation upon which subsequent decisions by the ICTY,
including the prosecution of the atrocities in Foca, were built.
The events in Foca marked the second attempt at ethnic
cleansing in Europe within the past fifty years and the first of two
significant worldwide attempts in the 1990s. 2 1 Although murder and
genocide were significant elements of the ethnic cleansing campaign
in the former Yugoslavia, just as they were in Rwanda, the actions in
Foca
also
involved
a
targeted
campaign
of gruesome
dehumanization-actualized as the rape and sexual enslavement of
approximately twenty thousand women--on a scale of inhumanity
22
that is unique in modern times.
On February 22, 2001, nine years after the Bosnian Serb soldiers
came to Foca, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY found three Bosnian Serb
soldiers-Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovicguilty of committing crimes against humanity including torture and
rape. 23 Human rights organizations worldwide immediately bailed
the verdict in Prosecutorv. Kunarac because wartime rape campaigns
were unequivocally defined as both a crime against humanity and a
war crime. 24 Furthermore, it expanded the definition of slavery as a
crime against humanity to include sexual slavery; previously, forced
labor was the only type of slavery to be viewed as a crime against
25
humanity.
The full impact of this decision, like its legal cousin Prosecutorv.
Akayesu, may not be felt for many years as other warring groups
must bear it in mind when contemplating committing similar acts;

20.
Askin, supranote 14, at 110 n.63.
21.
See, e.g., THE HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA (Walter Laquer & Judith Tydor
Baumel eds., Yale Univ. Press 2001).
22.
William Drozdiak, Serbs Forces Raped 20,000, EC Team Says, WASH. POST,
Jan. 9, 1993, at A12.
23.
The case was appealed, and on June 12, 2002 the Appeals Chamber upheld
the convictions and sentences of all three defendants. See generally Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of
Pers. Responsible for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 [hereinafter ICTY], Feb. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
24.
See, e.g., Bosnia: Landmark Verdict for Rape, Torture, and Sexual
Enslavement, supra note 9; see also Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Foca
verdict-Rape and Sexual Enslavement are Crimes Against Humanity, Feb. 22, 2001, at
http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/print/EUR630042001?OpenDocument;
Human Rights
Watch, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in WORLD REPORT 2002, at http://www.hrw.orglwr2k2/
europe5.html#developments.
25.
Q & A: The Impact of the Ruling, CNN, Feb. 22, 2001, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001[WORLD/europe/02/22/hague.trial.armanpour/index.htnil.
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indeed, Kunarac and Akayesu may signal the eventual end of
campaigns of sexual ethnic cleansing by warring parties. 26 Despite
their potential to reshape international law and norms of
international warfare, the Kunarac and Akayesu decisions are not
uncontroversial.
Both cases raise troubling issues about the
international community's judgment of state and individual
sovereignty as well as the questionableness of criminalizing behavior
after it has occurred. 27 Moreover, the decisions also raise a question
about the community's underlying views of women as rape victims views that some may argue inappropriately portray women simply as
weak and defenseless individuals. 28 In fact, just as the promulgation
of the battered women's syndrome defense sparked controversy in
U.S. legal circles over its possible underlying views of women, so too
may these decisions raise questions in international legal circles
regarding whether women should have a unique identity or a role as
29
victims in crimes against humanity.
Despite these criticisms, this Note argues that the expansion of
the definition of crimes against humanity in Kunarac and the
application of war crimes' standards to acts of rape and sexual
enslavement were warranted for several reasons. First, by building
upon the Akayesu decision, the expansion closed holes in the
international legal conceptualizations of rape and enslavement,
torture, war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, and it
brought prosecution of sexual crimes against women to the forefront
of international law. 30 Second, it broadened the enforcement of
international protections of civilians, especially those of different
ethnicities, from even unsystematic acts of depravity during an
armed conflict. 31 Third, it explicitly recognized women as equal to
men in the human community, but did not identify women as a

26.
27.

Id.
See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE

POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS (2000).

28.
See Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Perspectives on Women's
Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
328, 347-50 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (criticizing gender-based rape laws).
29.
See, e.g., Pamela Posch, The Negative Effects of Expert Testimony on the
Battered Women's Syndrome, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 485 (1998); A. Renee
Callahan, Will the "Real"Battered Woman Please Stand Up? In Search of a Realistic
Legal Definition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1994);

Kristian Miccio, In the Name of Mothers and Children:Deconstructing the Myth of the
Passive Battered Mother and the "Protected Child" in Child Neglect Proceedings, 58

ALB. L. REV. 1087 (1995).
30.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV (ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; see also infra Part V.A. 1. (discussing the
legal foundations of Kunarac).
31.
See Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T; see also infra Part
III.B.2. (discussing the significance of Kunaracfor Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War).
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weaker gender in need of protection. 32 Fourth, it established an
historic foundation for the prosecution of sexually-related crimes by
other international courts and, in doing so, did not violate the
sovereignty of either the state or the individuals who were culpable
33
for these crimes.
Because the ICTR and the Akayesu decision have been analyzed
in some ,detail already, this Note will focus primarily on the
implications of the Kunarac decision. However, the Akayesu decision
should be kept in mind as the legal and intellectual progenitor of
Kunarac, and the ICTR case is important to understand the
underlying jurisprudence in Kunarac. Part I of this Note examines
international law regarding crimes against humanity in the
twentieth century. Part II then discusses the specific milieu of the
acts committed by Kunarac and others, namely the conflict among the
former Yugoslavian republics. Part, III breaks down the Kunarac
decision in detail, including discussions of the cases by both the ICTY
and the ICTR upon which the Kunarac decision was founded. Part IV
looks at criticisms of the jurisprudential behavior at. issue in
international legal cases involving rape.
Part V analyzes the
implications of the rape cases decided by the ICTR and the ICTY for
the future of international law, and reasserts the legality, morality,
and humanity of those cases by locating them within appropriate
spaces of international law, conventional morality, and human
decency. To be sure, in the words of U.N. Coordinator of Operations
Jacques Klein, Kunarac itself may have been "a judgment that is long
overdue. ''34 Now that it has finally arrived, however, its impact may
be momentous.

I.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY PRIOR
35
TO AKAYESU AND KUNARAC

INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING

Legally, the notion of a crime against humanity had little
resonance until the twentieth century.
Few states saw an
international community capable of being harmed, and even fewer

32.
See Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T; see also infra Part
IV.D. (discussing Kunarac'sassessment of women).
33.
See Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T; see also infra
Parts W.A.-B., V.B.1. (discussing the sovereignty implications of Kunarac and its possible
use in future cases).
34.
Bosnian Serbs, Convicted of Rape, BBC NEWS, Feb. 22, 2001, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/l184313.stm.
35.
See, e.g., BASS, supra note 27; see also Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808, at 10-11, UN Doc. S/25704
(1993), reprinted in 32 ILM 1159 [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report] (quoting the
U.N. Secretary General's connections between the 1907 Hague Conventions, the
Nuremberg judgments, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the ICTY).
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36
felt that they could be held responsible for their conduct.
to
Nonetheless, as the twentieth century dawned, some states began
37
recognize a need for new norms that respected law and humanity.

A. Before Nuremberg and Tokyo
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 first contemplated
38
establishing normative principles based on the laws of humanity.
The Hague Conventions' attempts at creating such principles focused
primarily on efforts to limit warfare and arms buildup and to
establish an international court of justice, but the issue of sexual
attacks upon civilians did not arise during the meetings. 39 The
Conventions were ultimately unsuccessful in limiting warfare or what
would later be called "crimes against humanity," but they did
establish a foundation for the prosecution of-later violations of the
40
laws of humanity in the twentieth century.
Following the conclusion of World War I, the concept of
individual criminal liability for what would later be deemed human
rights violations began to acquire more meaning.4 1 For example,
Article 23 of the Covenant of the League of Nations contained an
express provision regulating the treatment of individuals in member
states, though the League's relative weakness made the enforcement
of such a provision difficult. 42 Moreover, the Allies did attempt to try

36.
See, e.g., Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War
Crimes and the Development of InternationalCriminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 68498 (1997).
37.
See generally GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE
STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE (1999) (tracing the history and development of the idea
of crimes against humanity).
38.
See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, July 29,
1899, pmbl., para. 9, 1 Bevans 247, 32 Stat. 1803, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT'L LAW 129
(1907). Paragraph 9 reads in part: "Populations and belligerents remain under the
protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they result from the
usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the
requirements of the public conscience." 32 Stat at 1805. See also Hague Convention
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803 (addressing international principles governing war on land); Hague Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
(updating the 1899 treaty).
39.
William J. Aceves, Critical Jurisprudence and International Legal
Scholarship: A Study of Equitable Distribution, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 299, 32732 (2001).
40.
McCormack, supra note 36, at 697.
41.
See generally, JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG: THE POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1982); see
also, Karina Michael Waller, Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts and InternationalLaw: How
the Rise of Intrastate Ethnic Conflicts Has Rendered InternationalHuman Rights Laws
Ineffective, Especially Regarding Sex-Based Crimes, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY &
L. 621 (2001).
42.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 23.
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German leaders, including the Kaiser, for war crimes.43 Additionally,
they also sought to try Turkish officials for their part in a genocidal
campaign against Armenians in 1915-1916. 44 Neither of these efforts
came to fruition as political infighting among the Allies and
realpolitik decision-making in the postwar environment ultimately
scuttled the attempts at trial; nonetheless, the seed of an idea for the
postwar adjudication of inhumane crimes during wartime was
planted, and this seed would grow to maturity twenty-five years later
45
at Nuremberg and Tokyo.
B. The Post-World War II Trials
The phrase "crimes against humanity" was first used publicly by
Allied prosecutors in the Nuremberg Trials. 46 It was given its
meaning by the charter which established the International Military
Tribunal to try Nazi officials following the conclusion of World War II
though, contrary to some assertions, the charter contained no specific
reference to rape as a crime against humanity:
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:
(a)

Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing:

(b)

War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population
of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or
persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation
not justified by military necessity:

(c),

Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated .... 47

The trials at Nuremberg, and' also the similar postwar trials of former
Japanese military officials in Tokyo, resulted in not only the

WILLIS, supranote 41; see also McCormack, supra note 36, at 705-08.
43.
WILLIS, supranote 41; see also McCormack, supra note 36, at 699-701.
44.
McCormack, supranote 36, at 698-708.
45.
46.
Leo Gross, The Punishment of War Criminals: The Nuremberg Trial, 2
NETH. INT'L L. REV. 356, 358 (1955). See also, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1992).
47.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), in Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
(London Agreement), Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280.
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convictions of several perpetrators of the Holocaust, but they also
established a clear foundation for the future prosecution of war
48
crimes and crimes against humanity.
C. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protectionof Civilian
Persons in Time of War
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention) was concluded in 1949
and entered into force on October 21, 1950.49 As its title implies, the
convention governs the treatment of civilians during times of war. 50
In relevant part, it asserts that "[w]omen shall be especially protected
against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape,
enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."'51 Thus, for the
first time in international law rape was considered to be a crime,
though its parameters at this time were ill-defined. 52 As the ICTY
later noted, the force of the Geneva Conventions within international
law is well-established, and Article 2 of the ICTY enabling statute
explicitly considers violations of the Geneva Conventions to be
53
offenses for which prosecution may be brought within its forum.
Consequently, the ICTY's reliance on the Geneva Conventions as a
source for establishing rape as a crime against humanity rests on a
solid foundation of international law.
D. The ICTR and the ICTY
Pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established
in 1994.54 A year earlier, the Security Council passed a resolution
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) for the prosecution of crimes committed during the
fighting among the states that emerged from the breakup of the

BASS, supra note 27; see also Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives:
48.
Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 57 (1995) (tracing the influence of the Nuremberg trials on the ICTY).
49.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art 3, 75 U.N.T.S 287-88, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention].
50.
Id.
51.
Id. art. 27.
52.
Id.
53.
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex
(1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. .1192 (amended 2002) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
54.

See generally THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: FACTS, CASES,

DOCUMENTS 240 (C. Schletana & W. Van Der Wolf, eds. 1999).
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former communist state of Yugoslavia. 55 As it later did for the ]CTR,

the Security Council gave the ICTY binding authority to prosecute
those individuals accused of committing grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and violations of the laws or customs or war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity, and also authorized that the
act of rape could fall under -the aegis of any of these violations and
crimes. 56 Former Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit and ICTY Judge Patricia M. Wald summarized the scope of
the ICTY's powers and responsibilities:
The ICTY was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution
in 1993 to prosecute and adjudicate war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia on or after January, 1991. That includes all aspects of the
Bosnian conflict as well as the more recent Kosovo war. The Tribunal
exercises personal jurisdiction over persons indicted for the categories
of war crimes set out in the, ICTY Statute, wherever apprehended; no
extradition proceedings are necessary. It can impose sentences up to
life imprisonment, but not death. The Tribunal is a temporary court in
the sense that its mission is geographically and temporally limited. It is
57
not expected to finish its work for at least another decade.

Furthermore, Judge Wald noted that the ICTY faces challenges that
go beyond its forerunners, such as the trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo
following World War II:
The ICTY is a bold experiment. It tracks to some degree the earlier
Nuremberg and Tokyo World War I war crime trials but it goes far
beyond those precedents in important ways. It is performing three
functions: adjudicating international crimes, developing international
humanitarian law, and memorializing important, albeit horrible, events
of modern history. Except for Nuremberg and Tokyo and subsequent
isolated war crimes prosecutions in national courts of figures such as
Adolph Eichmann and Klaus Barbie, the Tribunal has very little
caselaw to rely upon. Its procedures are a hybrid of common law and
continental practice and its judges speak a dozen native languages
58
more flue ntly than the official French and English of the Tribunal.

In Judge Wald's opinion, the most difficult aspect of the ICTY's work
was dealing with "the darkest and most brutal tales .. .of man's
inhumanity to man and woman, including genocide and crimes
against humanity involving thousands of victims, systematic rapes of
women and girls, prolonged detention under the most barbaric of
conditions, merciless beatings, and callous destruction of homes and

55.
See generally, ICTY Statute, supra note 53; see also U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res 827 (1993); U.N. Doc. S/RES/808(1993); U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
ICTY Statute, supra note 53.
56.
57.
Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Comes 'of Age: Some Observations on Day-To-Day Dilemmas of an
InternationalCourt, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POLr 87i 87 (2001).
58.
Id. at 89.
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In addition, the ICTY has faced challenges to its
villages."59
jurisdiction 60 and charges that it is biased against Serbs, yet both the
ICTY and the ICTR continue to function in their missions to bring a
sense of justice to victims of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. 6 1 Indeed, since the trial of Slobodan Milogevic-the former
leader of Serbia and the man many argue is most responsible for the
atrocities committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia-began
in February 2002,62 the ICTY has established itself as a significant
international judicial body capable of "perform[ing] important
adjudication and accountability functions that national courts in the
63
thrall of leaders who are themselves alleged war criminals cannot.

II.

THE CONFLICT IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE CREATION OF THE

ICTY

The roots of the conflict at issue in Kunarac go back at least to
the creation of a sovereign state of Yugoslavia following World War I,
and may even stretch earlier to the relations among ethnic groups,
first within the larger Ottoman Empire and then later as a mix of
sovereign states, such as Serbia and Montenegro, and territories of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, such as Croatia, Slovenia, and BosniaFollowing World War I, the victorious Allies
Herzegovina. 64
established the precursor to the modern Yugoslavian state, which
was officially named to reflect the diverse groups within its borders:
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. 65 Joseph Rothschild,
a noted historian of this region, concluded that this type of statecreation meant that the new multiethnic state was almost
preordained to face internal conflict:
Populated as it was by sundry antagonistic communities of widely
divergent cultures, who worshipped in several different religions, had
inherited eight legal systems from their former sovereignties, and wrote
the basic Serbocroatian language in two orthonographies (not to
mention their several other Slavic and non-Slavic languages),

59.
Id. at 88.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction (Rule
60.
73), No. IT-94-1, T.Ch. II (ICTY, Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/ind-e.htm.
61.
See, e.g., Katarina Kratovac, Fair Milosevic Trial Doubted, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 18, 2002. But see SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INT'L TRIB. FOR THE
PROSECUTION OF PERS. RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN
LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991, Aug. 7,
2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2000/index.htm.

62.

Keith B. Richburg, Trial of Milosevic Begins, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2002, at

Al.
63.
Wald, supra note 57, at 117-18.
See, e.g., Yugoslavia, available at
64.
section/yugoslav-history.asp.
65.
Id.

http://www.encyclopedia.comlhtml/
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Yugoslavia was bound to be subjected to profound centrifugal pressures
which were to overwhelm her elite. Furthermore, areas of mixed
populations, such as the Vojvodina, Bosnia, or Macedonia, functioned
less as bridges than as barriers, aggravating rather than easing these
66
centrifugal pressures.

Indeed, this new state, whose name was changed to Yugoslavia in
1929, faced intense nationalist strife among its various ethnic groups
in the 1920s and 1930s. 6 7 The Nazi invasion in 1941 led to the
creation of puppet states in Croatia and Serbia.6 8 Following this
invasion, several resistance groups of various nationalities emerged
including one led by Tito, a communist who would become the
postwar leader of Yugoslavia. 69 Partisan forces drove the Germans
from Yugoslavia in 1944, and Soviet troops installed Tito as the new
state consisted of six
leader of the country. 70 Under Tito, the new 71
primary republics and two autonomous regions.
Domestically, Tito was very successful at mediating the ethnic
tension within Yugoslavia by playing the various ethnic groups off
against one another.7 2 Even when ethnic issues did arise, Tito,
through the force of his cult of personality and his adept management
skills, successfully sidestepped major conflicts.7 3 Tito's successors
after his death in 1980, however, were not as adept as Tito had been
at managing the peculiar ethnic arrangements within Yugoslavia,
in 1989
and the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe
74
hastened the eruption of simmering ethnic hostilities.
Slobodan Milogevic was elected leader of the Serbian Communist
75
Party in 1987, and in 1989 he became President of Serbia.
Following attempts by Milogevic and his Serb supporters to impose
greater Serb authority on the entire Yugoslavian state, the republics
of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina each
declared its independence from 'the central Yugoslavian state in
1991.76 In response, Serbia used federal troops, composed primarily
of ethnic Serbs, to attack the seceding states in an effort to maintain
the territorial integrity of the Yugoslavian state and to unite all

66.
(1974).
67.
68.

69.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, EAST CENTRAL EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS 202
Yugoslavia, supra note 64.
Id.

Id.

Id.
70.
71.
The six republics were Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,
Macedonia, and Montenegro, and the two autonomous regions were Vojvodina and
Kosovo. Id.
72.
Yugoslavia, supranote 64.
73.
Id.; see also ROBERT KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY THROUGH
HISTORY (1994).

74.
75.
76.

Yugoslavia, supranote 64.
Id.
Id.
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Serbian peoples under one flag. 77 An initial campaign against
Slovenia failed, but Serbia was more successful in its attacks on
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 78 The latter, in particular, was a
prime target for Serbia because thirty percent of its population was
Serbian. 79 In addition to Serbia, Croatia also attacked BosniaHerzegovina because it claimed the Bosnian lands occupied by the
twenty percent of the Bosnian population that was ethnically
Croatian. 0 Thus, by 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely occupied
by two outside military forces, both of whom sought the elimination of
the local Bosnian Muslim population and committed terrible acts,
similar to the acts committed in Foca, in order to achieve .their
objectives.8 1 To be sure, no side in the conflict was blameless, but
although Croatia also committed some wartime atrocities, it was the
Serbian crimes that attracted more international attention because
82
they were more widespread and involved larger numbers of people.
Despite almost universal international condemnation, fighting
continued among Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina for another
three years before a peace accord was reached in Dayton, Ohio in
1995.83
The breakup and subsequent fighting raised several
important issues within international law, including the question of
how to treat those responsible for some of the terrible acts
perpetrated during the conflict.8 4 Following the conclusion of the
fighting, the United Nations established an International Tribunal of
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, known as the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, or ICTY. 85 As of November 7, 2001, the
ICTY held forty-six accused war criminals in custody, and had issued
arrest warrants for thirty-one others not in custody. Additionally, the
ICTY had adjudicated the cases of sixty-one accused war criminals in
proceedings before the Tribunal, including the Kunarac case that was
decided on February 22, 2001 and appealed on March 6, 2001.86

77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79.

Id.

80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
BROWN, supra note 10, at 265-70.
83.
Yugoslavia, supra note 64.
84,
See generally PETER RADAN, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002).

85.
86.

BREAK-UP

OF YUGOSLAVIA AND

See generally ICTY, at http://www.un.org/icty [hereinafter ICTY Web site].
Id. at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm.
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87

III. THE ICTY's DECISION

The ICTY named Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic, in addition to
Separate
several co-defendants, in an indictment in 1996.88
indictments were issued for these three men specifically in 1999, and
they were tried before the ICTY in 2000.89 Each man was accused of
crimes against humanity and of violations of the laws and customs of
war stemming from incidents and actions that occurred in Foca in
1992.90 Specifically, Kunarac was charged with rape, enslavement,
torture and the commitment of outrages upon personal dignity; Kovac
was charged with rape, enslavement and the commitment of outrages
upon personal dignity; and Vukovic was charged with torture and
91
rape.
A. Allegations
According to the factual allegations contained in the indictment,
Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic were part of the Bosnian Serb forces
that took over Foca in April 1992.92 Following the takeover, most of
the Croats and Muslims were arrested, the men and women were
separated, and all were kept in various detention facilities. 93 Indeed,
"[d]uring the arrests many civilians, were killed, beaten or subjected
to sexual assault. '94 Moreover, "[m]any of the detained women were
subjected to humiliating and degrading conditions of life, to brutal
''95
beatings and to sexual assaults, including rapes and gang rapes.
At a detention center within a school building, women and girls as
young as twelve years old were subjected to rape and sexual
96
assaults.
The indictment singled out each of the three defendants for
specific acts of brutality and barbarism. 97 As the commander of a
special reconnaissance unit of the Bosnian Serb Army, Kunarac was

87.

23/1-T

See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-

(ICTY, Feb.

22,

2001), available at http://www.un.org/ictylfocaltrialc2l

judgement/index.htm.
88.
Case Information Sheet: Kunavac, Kovac and Vukovic Case, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/glance/kunarac.htm [hereinafter Kunarac Web Site]. See also
Nahapetian, supra note 1, at 130.
89.
KunaracWeb Site, supra note 88.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. See also Nahapetian, supra note 1, at 130.
93.
KunaracWeb Site, supra note 88.

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96,

Id.; see also Bosnian Serbs Jailedfor War Sex Crimes, CNN, Feb. 22, 2001,

at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/02/22/hague.trial.02/indexhtml
the youthful ages of many of the victims).
97.
KunaracWeb site, supra note 88.

(noting

1284

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35'1269

alleged to have been responsible for the acts of the soldiers
subordinate to him and to have known or had reason to know that
those subordinates were engaged in the sexual assaults of detained
Muslim women; in other words, Kunarac, like Akayesu in Rwanda,
was charged with violating his command responsibility by allowing
98
and encouraging the rapes and sexual assaults to go on.
Additionally, Kunarac was alleged to have personally committed acts
of sexual assault and rape upon several Muslim women. 99 Kovac was
a sub-commander of the military police as well as a paramilitary
leader in Foca, and he was alleged to have been involved with the
rapes and sexual assaults of several detained Muslim women. 10 0
Finally, Vukovic, who was also a sub-commander of the military
police and paramilitary leader in Foca, was alleged to have been
personally involved in the gang-rape of women and girls detained at a
local school. 10 1 Moreover, he was also alleged to have sexually abused
other women detained at a sports hall, including a fifteen-year-old
and a sixteen-year-old, and he was alleged to have arranged the
removal of women from detention centers to private homes and
10 2
apartments in order to be further sexually abused.
B. The Decision
On February 22, 2001, the ICTY's Trial Chamber announced its
decision convicting Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic of both war crimes
and crimes against humanity. 10 3 Presiding Judge Florence Mumba
labeled the actions of the three men a "nightmarish scheme of sexual
exploitation" that was "especially repugnant.' 10 4 Furthermore, she
noted that the defendants "thrived in the dark atmosphere of the
dehumanisation of those believed to be enemies." 10 5 In short, the
ICTY left little doubt about its feelings regarding both the guilt of
Kunarac and the others, and the utter depravity of their actions;
moreover, in contrast to the ICTR's Akayesu decision, the ICTY in
Kunarac explicitly spelled out its legal reasoning in finding rape to be
06
both a war crime and a crimeagainst humanity.'

98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Convictions Highlight Tragic Victims, CNN,
http:llwww.cnn.com/200l/WORLD/europe/02/22hague.rape.
104.

Feb.

22,

2001,

at

Id.

105.
Id.
106.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), available at' http://www.un.org.icty.foca.trialc2/judgement/
index.htm.
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Among the crimes for which the three defendants were convicted,
enslavement had already been labeled as a crime against humanity
by the Nuremberg Trials; thus, the ICTY's decision to consider a
specific type of enslavement (i.e., sexual enslavement) as a crime
against humanity did not require a great extension of previous
international legal principles. 10 7 The Trial Chamber's decision to also
delineate rape as a crime against humanity, however, did require
more unpacking from previous international legal jurisprudence on
rape.10 8 The ICTY found the defendants guilty of war crimes and
crimes against humanity under Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY's
enabling statute and under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention. 10 9
Furthermore, the ICTY explicitly ruled that the rapes' in Foca
constituted a war crime in violation of both international
humanitarian law and the ICTY's enabling, statute. 1 10
Most
importantly, the Chamber also ruled that rapes in Foca constituted
an outrage upon personal dignity under Article 3(c) of the Geneva
Conventions.'
Therefore, although the definition of rape, and of
measures to prevent its occurrence, had not been written into the
Geneva Conventions explicitly, the act was still of such a terrible
nature that it could constitute a war crime as contemplated by the
112
Geneva Conventions' drafters.
1. Rape as a Crime Against Humanity
The Trial Chamber found that all three defendants committed
crimes against humanity in violation of Article 5 of the ICTY's
enabling statute.1 13 Article 5 specifically lists the offenses that
constitute crimes against humanity if they are committed in an
armed conflict and are considered to be directed against a civilian
population. 114 Article 5 states:

107.

Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), supra note 47. See

also HUMAN RIGHTS

INTERNET,

THE

INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL

CRIMINAL

RESPONSIBILITY,
available at
http://www.hri.ca/doccentre/docs/hrd/handbook97/
criminal.shtml#humanity (noting the categories of crimes against humanity used in
the Nuremberg Trials).
108.
See infra Part III.B.1.
109.
Press Release, Judgement of Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac &
Vukovic Case (Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p566-e.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2002).
110.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV, para. 408 (Applicable
Law) (ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/foca/trialc2/Judgement/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 17, 2002).
111
Id.
112.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note

113.
114.

Kunarac,Judgment, No. IT-96-23, at § V.
Id. § IV, para. 410.

107.
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The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict,
whether international or internal in character, and directed against
any civilian population:
(a)

murder;

(b)

extermination;

(c)

enslavement;

(d)

deportation;

(e)

imprisonment;

(f) torture;
(g)

rape;

(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i)

other inhumane acts.

115

Thus, Article 5(g) of the enabling statute specifically contemplates
that rape may be prosecuted as a crime.
Before the ICTY can actually try crimes against humanity, it
must establish jurisdiction over the offenses alleged to constitute
such crimes, and its jurisdiction under Article 5 is to try atrocities
committed by the participants of the Balkan conflict; therefore, as an
initial, threshold matter, the Trial Chamber must first determine
that the alleged offenses were indeed committed during an armed
conflict, for this prerequisite "goes beyond the stipulations of
customary international law."116 An armed conflict is defined as an
occurrence "whenever there is a resort to armed force between states
or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and
117
organized armed groups or between such groups within a state."
To fulfill this initial requirement, an armed conflict must exist at
the relevant time and place, namely the time and location of the acts
alleged in the indictment.1 18 A relational nexus between the acts of
the accused and the armed conflict, however, is not required. 119 In
this context, therefore, the acts by the defendants must have been
carried out during the course of the conflict in the Balkans, especially
in the context of the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rapes in
Foca were conducted amid that fighting in 1992, and it is well-

115.
ICTY Statute, supra note 53.
116.
Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, at § IV, para. 413.
117.
Id. § IV, para. 412 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-A, para. 70 (ICTY, Oct. 2,
1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
118.
Id. § IV, para. 413 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A,
paras. 249, 251 (ICTY, July 15, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
119.
Id. (citing Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, § III, paras. 249, 272; see also
Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-14-T, § II, para. 71 (ICTY, Mar. 3, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
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established that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was ongoing at that
time. Consequently, the -first prerequisite for ICTY jurisdiction was
clearly met.
For jurisdiction to attach, after the ICTY determines that the
alleged offenses were indeed committed during an armed conflict, it
must then also conclude that there was an attack directed against a
civilian population. 120 The five elements of an "attack directed
against any civilian population" are:
(1)
(2)

There must be an attack.
The acts of the perpetrator must be part of the attack.

(3)
(4)

The attack must be "directed against any civilian population."
The attack must be "widespread or systematic."

(5)

The perpetrator must know of the wider context in which his acts
occur and know that his acts are part of the attack. 121

According to the ICTY, an attack may be defined as "a course of
conduct involving the commission of acts of violence," and the ICTY
relied on a previous case, Prosecutorv. Tadic, to assert that an attack
122
will normally be a pattern of conduct and not one particular act.
Furthermore, the term "attack" carries with it a different meaning in
regard to crimes against humanity than it does in regard to war
crimes', for in the context of a crime against humanity, an attack is
not limited to the conduct of hostilities; in fact, it may also apply to
the treatment of those not actively involved in the fighting, such as
the mistreatment of prisdners in detention. 12 3 Additionally, a nexus
must exist between the acts of the accused and the attack:
(1) the commission of an act which, by its nature or consequences, is
objectively part of the attack; coupled with
(2) knowledge on the part of the accused that there is an attack on the
124
civilian population and that his act is part of the attack.

The Commentary to the Two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 suggests that the term "civilian
population" applies only to a narrowly-defined range of people, and
not to those who may constitute members of the armed forces or to
other active participants in the conflict composed primarily of

120.
Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV, para. 410.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. § V, para. 415.
Id. § IV, para. 416.
123.
124.
Id. (citing Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, § III, paras. 248, 251, 271);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 659 (ICTY, May 7,
1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Review of
the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, No. IT-9513-R61, para. 30 (ICTY, Apr. 3, i996); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Decision on Prosecution's
Motion for Exclusion of Evidence and Limitation of Testimony, Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-9623/1, para. 6(b) (ICTY, July 3, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/ icty/ind-ehtm).
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members from the civilian population; consequently, although the
Geneva Conventions view an attack as simply an act of violence
against an adversary, the character of that adversary must be purely
12 5
military, for a "civilian population cannot be a legitimate target."'
The attack on the civilian population must also be "widespread
or systematic" to fall under the language of Article 5, which thereby
excludes isolated or random acts of violence. 126 Only the attack itself,
however, must be widespread or systematic to attach jurisdiction, so
the individual acts of the accused do not necessarily have to be
widespread or systematic. 12 7 In fact, in the Tadic case, the ICTY held
that "[t]he very nature of the criminal acts in respect of which
competence is conferred upon the International Tribunal by Article 5,
that they be directed against any civilian population, ensures that
what is to be alleged will not be one particular act but, instead, a
course of conduct."'12 8 The underlying offense also does not need to
constitute an attack in itself; rather, it must only form a part of the
overall attack, or it must "comprise part of a pattern of widespread
i 29
and systematic crimes directed against a civilian population."
In a previous crimes-against-humanity case, Prosecutor v.
Mrksic, the ICTY clarified the relationship between the nature of an
attack and its ability to constitute a crime against humanity:
Crimes against humanity . . . must be widespread or demonstrate a
systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single
act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual
committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of
victims might be recognized as guilty of a crime against humanity if his
acts were part of the specific context [of an attack against a civilian
population].

1 30

As an example of how an individual act could be regarded as a crime
against humanity in the proper context, the Trial Chamber discussed
the act of denouncing Jewish neighbors to Nazi authorities:
For example, the act of denouncing a Jewish neighbour to the Nazi
authorities-if committed against a background of widespread

125.

Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, at § IV, para. 426 (citing COMMENTARY

ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12

AUGUST 1949 611, 1451-52 (1987)).
126.
Id. § IV, para. 427 (citing Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T,
para. 648).

127.
128.
Indictment,

Id. § IV, para. 431.
Id. § IV, para. 422 (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Form of the
No.

IT-94-1-A,

para.

11

(ICTY,

Nov.

14,

1995),

available

at

http:llwww.un.orglictylind-e.htm).
129.
Id. § IV, para. 417; see also Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, § III, paras.
248, 255.
130.
Id. § IV, para. 417 (quoting Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Review of the Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, No. IT-95-13-R61, para.
30 (ICTY, Apr. 3, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind.e.htm).
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persecution-has been regarded as amounting to a crime against
humanity. An isolated act, however,-i. e. an atrocity which did not
131
occur within such a context-cannot.

The mental element required for a violation of Article 5 is that in
addition to the intent to commit the underlying offense, the accused
must simply know that his actions occurred within the context; of a
broader attack on the civilian population; however, the accused does
need to have detailed knowledge of the attack. 132 In Tadic, the
Appeals Chamber of the ICTY concluded that the motives of a
defendant in taking part in an attack are irrelevant and that a
defendant may commit a crime against humanity for purely personal
reasons. 133 Additionally, the defendant must have reason to believe
that the victim of the attack was a civilian, but prosecutors do not
need to prove that the victims were chosen because of their civilian
in cases of doubt,
status. 134 Finally, the Trial Chamber stressed that 135
the ICTY will assume that the victim was a civilian.
It is sufficient for the prosecution to demonstrate that the act of
an accused person at issue occurred amid an accumulation of acts of
violence, even though the individual acts within that set may vary
greatly in nature and gravity. 136 Even though the attack must be
part of the overall armed conflict, it may also outlast the hostilities,
and such attacks may be prosecuted even if they occurred after
137
hostilities concluded.
In Kunarac, the ICTY held that the actions of the defendants
constituted a widespread and systematic attack upon the civilian
population during the conflict in the Balkans. 138 In other words, the
ICTY concluded that the rapes of Bosnian Muslim women in Foca
were well-orchestrated and that Kunarac and the others possessed
the requisite mens rea regarding their intent in committing an attack
upon civilians. 139 As part of the larger armed conflict that engulfed
much of the former Yugoslavia in 1992, the women of Foca were
rounded up, placed under armed guard, and then intentionally raped,

Id. § IV, para. 431 (emphasis in original).
131.
Id. § IV, para. 434 (citing Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, § III, para. 248;
132.
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, No. IT-94-1-T, para. 659 (ICTY, May 7,
1997); Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-16-T, § V, para. 556 (ICTY, Jan.
14, 2000), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
Id. § IV, para. 433 (citing Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, § III, para. 248).
133.
134.
Id. § IV, para. 435.
Id.
135.
Id. § IV, para. 419.
136.
Id. § IV, para. 420; see also Tadic, Judgment, No. IT-94-1-A, at § III, para.
137.
251; Kupreskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-16-T, at § V, para. 546; Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-A,
para. 69 (ICTY, Oct. 2, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T
138.
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
Id.
139.
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abused, and used as sex slaves. 140 Therefore, the actions of Kunarac
and the others, particularly their acts of rape, clearly constituted
crimes against humanity in violation of Article 5 of the ICTY
Statute.

14 1

2. Rape as a War Crime
Additionally, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that Kunarac,
Kovac, and Vukovic committed war crimes, namely the crimes of rape
and torture in violation of both Article 3 of the ICTY's enabling
statute and, under customary international law, Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention. 142 Article 3 of the ICTY enabling statute, titled
Violations of the Laws or Customs of War and incorporates the 1907
Hague Convention and the Regulations annexed to it, states:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to:
(a)
employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering;
(b)
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not
justified by military necessity;
(c)
attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;
(d)
seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences,
historic monuments and works of art and science;
(e)

plunder of public or private property.

14 3

In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY interpreted Article 3 to
encompass other violations of international humanitarian law beyond
those of the Hague Conventions:
It can be held that Article 3 is a general clause covering all violations of
humanitarian law not falling under Article 2 or covered by Articles 4 or
5 [of the Statute of the Tribunal], more specifically: (i) violations of the
Hague law on international conflicts; (ii) infringements of provisions of
the Geneva Conventions other than those classified as grave breaches
by those Conventions; (iii) violations of common Article 3 [of the Geneva
Conventions] and other customary rules on internal conflicts; (iv)
violations of agreements binding upon the parties to the conflict,

140.
ABUSES IN
141.
142.
143.

Id; see also A CLOSED DARK PLACE: PAST AND PRESENT HUMAN RIGHTS
FOCA, supra note 5 (detailing the specific treatment of the women of Foca).
See Kunarac,Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T.
See Press Release, supra note 109.
See ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 3.
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considering qua treaty law, i.e., agreements which have not turned into
144
customary international law ....

Consequently, in the view of the ICTY, Article 3 functions as a
"residual clause designed to ensure that no serious violation of
international humanitarian law is taken away from the jurisdiction of
the International Tribunal. '145 Two preliminary requirements must
be met in order for Article 3 to apply: (1) an armed conflict, defined as
"a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or

between such groups within a State,"'1 46 must be present, and (2) a
close nexus must exist between the alleged crime and the armed
conflict. 147
The second relationship requirement is satisfied
whenever the alleged crime is "closely related to the hostilities.""'8 In
Tadic, the Appeals Chamber identified four additional requirements
specific to the application of Article 3:
(1)
the violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law;
(2)
the rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty
law, the required conditions must be met...;
(3)
the violation must be "serious," that is to say, it must constitute
a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must
involve grave consequences for the victim...

144.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV, para. 401 (ICTY, Feb.
22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1AR72, para. 89 (ICTY, Oct. 2, 1995), confirmed in Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, No.
IT-96-21-A, § I, paras. 125, 136 (ICTY, Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/ind-e.htm).
145.
Id. (quoting Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at para. 91).
146.
Id. § IV, para. 402 (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at para. 70).
147.
Id. (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 70; Prosecutor's Pre-Trial Brief I, para. 98101; Prosecutor's Final Trial Brief, para. 690-96); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Judgment, No. IT-96-21-T, § III, para. 193 (ICTY, Nov. 16, 1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-14-T, § II,
paras. 65, 69 (ICTY, Mar. 3, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm).
148.
Id. (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at para. 70). In Delalic, the ICTY required "an
obvious link" or a "clear nexus" between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict.
Delalic, Judgment, No. IT-96-21-T, § III, paras. 193, 197. In Blaskic, the Trial
Chamber referred to this requirement as finding an "evident nexus between the alleged
crimes and the armed conflict as a whole." Blaskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-14-T, § II,
para. 69.
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(4)
the violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person
14 9
breaching the rule.

Based upon these four elements, the ICTY concluded that the
general requirements for the 'apliation of Article 3 differ "depending
on the specific basis of the relevant charges brought under
Article 3."150 For example, if a charge is brought based on a treaty
violation, then two additional requirements must be met: (1) the
treaty must be binding upon the parties at the time the violation
occurred, and (2) the treaty must be congruent with the norms of
customary international law. 15 1
Additionally, the ICTY held that the rapes perpetrated by
Kunarac and the others constituted a violation of Article 3 of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. 152 Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following
provisions:
1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a)
Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b)

Taking of hostages;

(c)
Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d)
The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.

149.
Id. § IV, para. 403 (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at para. 94). The Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski endorsed these requirements. Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Judgment, No. IT-95-14/1-A, § 1, para. 20 (ICTY, Mar. 24, 2000), available
at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
150.
Id. § IV, para. 404.
151.
Id. (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 143).
152.
Id. § IV, paras. 400, 405.
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2.
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force,
by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of
the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal
153
status of the Parties to the conflict.

The ICTY stated that "it is well established in the jurisprudence
of the Tribunal that common Article 3, as set out in the Geneva
Conventions, has acquired the status of customary international
law."'154 Consequently, the ICTY Trial Chamber declined to review
any existing treaties, for it determined that the application of
common Article 3 would be the same under treaty law or under

customary international law; in other words, because common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions acquired status as customary
international law, it was a sufficient basis for prosecution and
The Trial Chamber delineated six
conviction by itself. 155
requirements that must be met in order for Article 3 of the Geneva

Conventions to apply:
(1)
The violation must constitute an infringement of a rule of
international humanitarian law.
(2) The rule must be customary in nature or, if it belongs to treaty law,
the required conditions must be met.
(3)
The violation must be "serious," that is to say, it must constitute
a breach of a rule protecting important values, and the breach must
involve grave consequences for the victim.
The violation of the rule must entail, under customary or
(4)
conventional law, the individual criminal responsibility of the person
breaching the rule.
There must be a close nexus between the violations and the
(5)
armed conflict.
The violations must be committed against persons taking no
(6)
156
active part in the hostilities.

Additionally, the Trial Chamber in Kunarac noted that common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions may require a relationship

153.
Id. § IV, para. 405; see also Geneva Convention, supra note 49.
154.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV, para. 406 (ICTY, Feb.
22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm (citing Tadic, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, at paras.
98, 134; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, No. IT-96-21-A, § I, para. 143 (ICTY, Feb. 20,
2001), available at http:l/www.un.orgiicty/ind-e.htm).
155.
Id. § IV, para. 406.
156.
Id. § IV, para. 407 (citing Delalic, Judgment, No. IT-96-21-A, § V, para.
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between the accused and a party to the conflict. 157 In the instant
case, however, the Trial Chamber saw no need to determine whether
such a relationship was actually required, for the three defendants all
fought "on behalf of one of the parties to the conflict [the Bosnian
Serb paramilitary force] :,15
The ICTY was satisfied that the actions of Kunarac and the two
other defendants met all of the four general requirements set out in
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
Not only were the many underlying crimes made possible by the armed
conflict, but they were very much a part of it. Muslim civilians were
killed, raped or otherwise abused as a direct result of the armed conflict
and because the armed conflict apparently offered blanket impunity to
the perpetrators. It is irrelevant that the actual fighting had shifted
from Foca town once it was safely in Serb hands to the surrounding
areas by the time the events charged occurred, because the criterion of
a nexus with the armed conflict under Article 3 of the Statute does not
require that the offences be directly committed whilst fighting is
actually taking place, or at the scene of combat. Humanitarian law
continues to apply in the whole of the territory under the control of one
of the parties, whether or not actual combat continues at the place
where the events in question took place. It is therefore sufficient that
the crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other parts
of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.
The
requirement that the act be closely related to the armed conflict is
satisfied if, as in the present case, the crimes are committed in the
aftermath of the fighting, and until the cessation of combat activities in
a certain region, and are committed in furtherance or take advantage of
1 59
the situation created by the fighting.

In short, the Trial Chamber concluded that the rapes in Foca
constituted an infringement of international humanitarian law
because they violated common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. 160 Moreover, the ICTY specifically reiterated the idea
that that common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions has attained
the status of customary international law.'61

To be sure, the Trial

Chamber did raise the question of whether all breaches of common
Article 3 would constitute serious violations of international
humanitarian law; however, it declined to address that question in
more detail because it concluded that rape is a serious offense which

157.
Id.
158.
Id.
159
Id. § V, para. 568.
160.
Id. § IV, para. 408.
161.
Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 98 (ICTY, Oct. 2, 1995),
available at http://www.un.org/ictyfind.e.htm).'
This was affirmed in Delalic,
Judgment, No. IT-96-21-A, § II, paras. 143, 150; see also Prosecutor v. Blaskic,
Judgment, No. IT-95-14-T, § II, para. 166 (ICTY, Mar. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm; Secretary-General's Report, supra note 35, para. 35.
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unquestionably satisfies the requirements of common Article 3.162
Finally, relying on its Tadic holding that customary international law
imposes criminal liability for serious violations of common Article 3,
the Trial Chamber consequently held that a violation of common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions could -be used -to satisfy the
fourth general requirement for a violation of Article 3 of the ICTY
enabling statute. 163 Thus, the defendants were criminally liable for
the rapes under Article 3 of the ICTY enabling statute and under
164
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
The Trial Chamber found all three defendants guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity for their various offenses:
Kunarac was found guilty of rape, torture and enslavement; Kovac
was found guilty of enslavement, rape, and outrages upon personal
dignity; and Vukovic was found guilty of torture and rape. 165- All
three were sentenced to prison: Kunarac for twenty-eight years,
Kovac for twenty years, and Vukovic for twelve years. 166 On June 12;
2002, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY upheld the convictions and
sentences of all three perpetrators. 16 7 The ICTR Akayesu decision,
that considered rape to be an act of genocide, laid the foundation for
Kunarac; however, the, ICTY' in Kunarac went beyond Akayesu in
clearly detailing the legal rationale for its holdings as it
unequivocally established rape and sexual enslavement as crimes
Furthermore, the ICTY reiterated the
against humanity. 168
conclusion that rape and sexual enslavement could also be considered
war crimes. 16 9 Although the decisions in Akayesu and Kunarac may
not necessarily prevent campaigns of mass rape against civilians in
future wars, they nonetheless establish clear boundaries for
intolerable behavior; indeed, after Akayesu and Kunarac, any rape
during war may become tantamount to a crime against humanity, a

162.
Id. (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 134 (emphasis added)); Blaskic, Judgment,
No. IT-95-14-T, § II, para. 134.
163.
Id. (citing Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal
on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-AR72, para. 134; confirmed in Delalic, Judgment, No. IT96-21-A, § II, para. 174; see also Blaskic, Judgment, No. IT-95-14-T, § II, para. 134).
164.
See id. § V, para. 568,
165.
Id. § VI, paras. 883-90.
166.
Id. § VI, paras. 885, 887, 890.
167.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1, § I, para.
32 (Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, June 12, 2002) available at http://www.un.org/icty/
ind-e.htm.
168.
Landmark ruling, AMNESTY MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2001, available at
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news/mag/mar01/news.shtml. See also Kunarac,Judgment,
No. IT-96-23, § VI, paras. 883-90; ICTY Web Site, supra note 85.
See, e.g., ,Christopher Scott Maravella, Rape As A War Crime: The
169.
Implications of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former Yugoslavia's
Decision in Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, & Vukovic on InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 321 (2001). •
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war crime, or an act of genocide. In other words, such behavior may
not necessarily be prevented in the future, but these decisions
strongly suggest that such behavior is less likely to be tolerated or
ignored by the international legal community.

IV. JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITICISMS OF FINDING RAPE AS A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY

Like previous international law decisions that affected the scope
of the nature of crimes against humanity, recent decisions by the
ICTY and the ICTR, such as Kunarac and Akayesu, are not without
criticism. 170 Indeed, these decisions represent a trade off between
domestic state autonomy and the desire of the international
community to effectuate justice following the commission of
particularly inhumane crimes. 171 Like its predecessor Akayesu,
Kunarac clearly focuses more on the justice side of the balance sheet,
but its reach for justice may go too far such that it inappropriately
violates the sovereignty of either Serbia or Kunarac and the other
defendants. 172 Moreover, these decisions may contain underlying byproducts, such as the violation of conventional due process and the
reification of gender stereotypes about women, that undercut the
173
overall attempts by the ICTR and the ICTY to secure justice.
Ultimately, this Note argues that the Kunarac decision and its
predecessor Akayesu were justified, and indeed, both cases were
upheld on appeal; however, the criticisms that emerged in the wake
of Kunarac are nonetheless worth exploring because of what they
reveal about the nature of international human rights justice and
because of how they may be addressed in future human rights' cases.
A. Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity Violates Established
Principlesof State and Personal Sovereignty
Under the Charter of the United Nations, one state cannot
interfere with the domestic affairs of another state. 174 Furthermore,
the idea of state sovereignty embodied in the U.N. Charter is a
bedrock principle of international law, and the prosecution of state
officials acting under government orders may be viewed as a violation

170.
See, e.g., George Will, Lawless Redress, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2001, at A19
(raising "serious questions about ad hoc uses of judicial forums created in response to
particular events, forums such as the court for the former Yugoslavia and the tribunal
concerning genocide in Rwanda").
171.
McCormack, supra note 36, at 730-32.
172.
See infra Parts IV.A., IV. B.
173.
See infra Parts IV.C., IV. D.
174.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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of that state sovereignty. 175 Indeed, Serbian officials raised such an
argument in their defense, claiming that their actions were domestic
affairs within Yugoslavia; thus, they argued,1 76their actions were not
subject to outside interference or prosecution.
This criticism is unpersuasive, however, for several reasons.
First, the rapes in Foca were not purely domestic affairs of the
Serbian government, for Foca is located in a state, BosniaHerzegovina, that achieved the criteria of statehood and was
recognized as such in 1992.177 Thus, one cannot argue that the mass
rape of Bosnian women by Serbian paramilitary fighters was
inherently a domestic Serbian incident. 78 Second, no modern state
asserts the right not to be bound by jus cogens norms or norms of
customary international law that prohibit the commission of genocide
or crimes against humanity. 179 In other words, even though similar
violations of international law, including mass rape, had not, been
prosecuted in the past, Serbia cannot now claim that its actions are
not subject to prosecution by an international tribunal precisely
because it undertook policies that violated international law.
Third, and perhaps most consequentially, previous judgments by
international tribunals regarding war crimes and crimes against
humanity, including the ICTR's judgment against Akayesu, suggest
Although precedent is not
that this argument is invalid.' 80
determinative in international law as it is generally in a common law
legal system like in the United States, the decisions of previous
international tribunals are not without some type of precedential
value. 18 1 In fact, Nazi officials offered similar arguments about state
sovereignty during the Nuremberg Trials, and those arguments were
roundly rejected. 182 Put more simply, a state does not have the

175.
See generally Anne Bodley, Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in
International Law: The InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 417 (1999). See also Guy Roberts, Assault on Sovereignty:
The Clear and Present Danger of the New International Criminal Court, 17 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 35 (2001).

See International Action Center, Milosevic Puts 'Tribunal" on Trial,
176.
available at http://www.iacenter.org/sm-tohague.htm.
177.
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in WORLD
FACTBOOK 2001, available at http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html.
Human Rights Watch, The Milosevic Case: Questions and Answers, Human
178.
Rights News, available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2001/08/milo-q&a-0829.htm.
179.
Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary InternationalLaw: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 783-84 (2001).

But see Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 413, 427, 438 (1983) (asserting that jus cogens norms should not be viewed as
customary international law because they do not require consent).
Christin B. Coan, Rethinking the Spoils of War: ProsecutingRape as a War
180.
Crime in the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 26 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 183, 203 (2000).

181.
182.

Roberts, supra note 179, at 774-75.
Coan, supra note 180, at 203.
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sovereignty to massacre its people under any kind of international
legal standard.
Arguably, the prosecutions of Kunarac in the former Yugoslavia,
Akayesu in Rwanda, and all other defendants from both locations
were interferences with personal, individual sovereignty.' 8 3 In each
case, defendants were taken from their home states, detained in
another state, and prosecuted by a politically-charged tribunal whom
the defendants asserted was biased; moreover, in the case of
defendants before the ICTY, their detentions occurred in a state on
the other side of the continent, and their trials took place amid a
highly charged political backdrop of the worst human rights abuses in
Europe since World War 11.184 Consequently, the defendants felt that
they could not receive a fair hearing in an international forum and
thus, they should have been tried domestically, if at all.'8 5 Moreover,
the defendants felt that they should not even be tried as individuals
before an international tribunal.18 6 Indeed, if any entity should have
been prosecuted, it should have been the state because the
1 87
defendants were merely following orders from the -state.
Although the concept of individual sovereignty is not recognized
uniformly within international law, these arguments fail even upon
their own merits. First, international public policy outweighs any
interference with personal sovereignty because of the likelihood that
most defendants before the tribunals would never be tried in domestic
courts.1 8 8
As Judge Wald observed regarding the ICTY, an
international tribunal can perform important "accountability
functions that national courts in the thrall of leaders who are
themselves alleged war criminals cannot."'1 9 Second, Article 7 of the

183.
See Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Position of the Individual in
InternationalLaw, 31 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 241 (2001); see also Bruno Simma & Andreas
L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal
Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302, 309 (1999) (noting that "[c]rimes
against humanity constitute a more difficult case as regards individual responsibility").
184.
See generally Human Rights Watch, Bosnia and Hercegovina, in WORLD
REPORT 2001, War Criminals, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2kl/europe/bosnia.html.
185.
Letter from the Charge D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations Addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/481170-S/25801 (1993); see also Simma & Paulus, supra note 186,
at 314 (noting that "[s]tates remain ...

reluctant . . . to bring their own leaders to

justice").
186.
Milosevic Puts "Tribunal"on Trial, supra note 176.
187.
This idea was wholly rejected by the ICTY. See Convictions Highlight
Tragic Victims, supra note 103 (quoting Judge Florence Mumba's admonition that
"[1lawless opportunists should expect no mercy, no matter how low their position in the
chain of command may be").
188,
Wald, supra note 57, at 117-18; see also Simma & Paulus, supra note 183,
at 314 (arguing that failing to prosecute heads-of-state domestically "runs counter to
the stated purpose of international humanitarian law, i.e.', to exclude certain criminal
acts from the legitimate exercise of state functions").
189.
Wald, supra note 57, at 117-18.
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ICTY enabling statute and Article 6 of the ICTR enabling statute
explicitly consider individual criminal responsibility for acts
committed in relation to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda
respectively; therefore, the ICTY and the ICTR have personal
jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who may be criminally liable for
190
Furthermore,
violations of international law in these settings.
Article 7(4) of the ICTY enabling statute and Article 6(4) of the ICTR
enabling statute expressly prohibit a "just following orders" defense,
191
although they do allow such a claim as a mitigating factor.
Moreover,: the ability of the ICTY and the ICTR to prosecute
individuals reflects a growing trend in international law to expand
192
Finally, the defense of "just
the legal personalty of individuals.
following orders," even if not prohibited by the enabling statutes of
the ICTY and the ICTR, has been soundly rejected by international
193
law since the Nuremberg Trials.
Upon first glance, both of the sovereignty criticisms are
intuitively appealing, yet neither have been .recognized as a defense
to the prosecution of suspected war criminals or defendants charged
194
Indeed, the failure of these
with crimes against humanity.
arguments suggests that the international community believes in a
hierarchy of values under which state and personal sovereignty may
be trumped in extreme circumstances, such as crimes against
humanity. 195 In other words, the Kunarac and Akayesu prosecutions
and decisions do constitute violations of state and individual
sovereignty, but they do so in pursuit of a higher goal: justice.
B. The InternationalProsecution of Rape Represents Ex Post fiacto,
Retroactive Adjudication
The conviction of Kunarac and his co-defendants by the ICTY, as
well as the conviction of Akayesu by the ICTR, may be criticized on
the grounds that the convictions were based on ex post facto crimes;
196
thus, the tribunals violated norms of due process and fairness.
Prior to Akayesu and Kunarac, rape was a reprehensible, vicious and
inhumane action; however, it was not explicitly recognized within
197
Indeed, contrary to
international law as a crime against humanity.

ICTY Statute, supra note 53, art. 7.
190.
Id. art. 7(4).
191.
See, e.g., P.K. Menon, The International Personality of Individuals in
'192.
International Law: A Broadening of the Traditional Doctrine, 1 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 151,182 (1992).
Coan, supra note 180, at 203.
193.
See infra text accompanying notes 174-93.
194.
Id.
195.
See McCormack, supra note 36, at 731.
196.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T
197.
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), availableat http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
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what some have later asserted, the Charter authorizing the
Nuremberg Trials, for example, did not explicitly list rape as a
criminal offense. 198 To be sure, rape was clearly a violation of the
Geneva Conventions, and it was also generally recognized as a war
crime under international law; however, rape "overwhelmingly has
been viewed by the international community as an inevitable product
of war, and as such, has seldom been prosecuted." 199 Furthermore,
even though it was conceptually illegal as a war crime or as a
violation of the Geneva Conventions, rape had not been defined under
international law, leaving the ICTY in the paradoxical position of
trying "sexual assault cases under a statute that offers
groundbreaking international recognition of the crime of rape [even
though] the ICTY's mandate explicitly prohibits it from applying
anything other than accepted definitions of international
humanitarian law. '' 20 0 Thus, the ICTY's assessment "of the legal gray

area occupied by rape under international humanitarian law cannot° 1
20
help but position it in what some would call a legislative role.
Consequently, the ICTY, despite its Article 5(g) statutory charge, had
no clear legal justification for trying rape as a crime against
humanity because it had noclear definition of the crime that it was
adjudicating.
Therefore, because rape was not defined expressly as a crime
against humanity at the time that the events in Foca transpired and
because the crime of rape was not clearly defined within international
law in general, the standard by which Kunarac and the other
defendants were prosecuted was necessarily ex post facto. This
criticism of international prosecutions was raised by Akayesu before
the ICTR, but was most famously asserted by Senator Robert Taft
during the Nuremberg Trials because such ad hoc international
tribunals like the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
seemed to run against the traditional U.S. notion of justice that
202
prohibits someone from being retroactively convicted of a crime.
Indeed, a prohibition on ex post facto crimes is even enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution, raising the troubling question of why Kunarac and
the other criminal defendants should be held to a standard beyond
20 3
that of the U.S. Constitution.
Again, this criticism has some initial appeal, but two
counterarguments strongly question its validity. First, previous
conventions and norms of international law explicitly prohibited

See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed to the London
198.
Agreement, August 8, 1945, 59.Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288.
199.
Coan, supra note 180, at 184.
200.
Id. at 195.
201.
Id.
202.
See JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 211-24 (1956).
3.
203.
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl.
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torture and enslavement, and both categories may include the crime
of rape, especially as it.was perpetrated in Foca and the surrounding
areas. 20 4 Consequently, rape may have implicitly been a crime
against humanity under these other categories even if it was not
recognized as a specific crime of its own; therefore, the defendants
before the ICTY and the ICTR did commit acts recognized as criminal
at the time they were committed, even though rape itself was not
clearly a crime against humanity.
Furthermore, the Geneva
Conventions explicitly recognized rape as crime, even though there
was no clear definition of rape within international law and even
though rape was rarely prosecuted as a war crime. 20 5 Therefore, the
acts of Kunarac and the others, as well as those of Akayesu in
Rwanda, clearly constituted an international crime even if that crime
was not well-defined at the time it occurred.
Second, one may plausibly argue that any standard permitting
rape during war had already been abandoned by the same
conventional
reasoning that also
prohibited torture and
enslavement. 20 6 From this perspective, such an argument is similar
to that offered recently by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rogers v.
Tennessee, where the Court upheld the conviction of a man for
murder even though his actions did not constitute that crime under
the law at the time when they occurred. 20 7 In the words of Justice
O'Connor, the Court merely brought "the law into conformity with
reason and common sense." 208 A similar logic can be applied to the
situations faced by both the ICTR and the ICTY, for both brought
international law regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity
into conformity with reason and common sense, especially in light of
other similar crimes already prohibited..
C. InternationalCriminalProsecution of Rape Reifies Women as a
Weaker Sex in Need of Special Protections
Arguably, the Akayesu and Kunarac decisions reify hoary
stereotypes of women as a weaker sex in need of special protection
under international law. Indeed, the Geneva Conventions, on which
the ICTY relied for part of its decision, mentions women only in
connection with rape, a convention that probably reflected traditional
20 9
thinking at the time that the Geneva Conventions were drafted.

204.
See, e.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, entered into force June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 ILM 535 (1985).
205.
Geneva Convention, supra note 49.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 204-05.
207.
See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
208. Id.
209. .Geneva Convention, supra note 49.
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Furthermore, the ICTY's "case law stipulates that witnesses who
have suffered traumatic experiences are not necessarily considered
unreliable, and its statute requires no corroboration of testimony
from rape victims. '2 10 Consequently, it reinforces the stereotypical
view of women as helpless victims whose accusations are taken
unquestionably without corroboration in order to afford them more
2 11
protection as victims.
This argument fails to consider the essence of the decisions in
Akayesu and Kunarac in two crucial respects. First, decisions by the
ICTY and the ICTR apply equally to men and women; thus, both
genders are afforded the protections under international law
determined by the tribunals. 212 Second, men were already accorded
2 13
Put
protections during time of war as both soldiers and civilians.
more forcefully, the "exclusion of the corroboration requirement
'confirms the formal international standards of equality between the
sexes. ' 214 In other words, the decisions by the ICTR and the ICTY
simply bring women into an equal position as men under
international law, vis-i-vis their status as innocent civilians. 2 15 In
short, rather than reinforcing tired stereotypes about women and
their weakness and vulnerability during war, the decisions by the
tribunals, especially the Kunarac decision by the ICTY, actually
make women more fully members of the international community and
216
subject to the same protections as men.

V. JUSTIFICATIONS OF KUNARAC AND AKAYESU AND THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF THESE DECISIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW

The criticisms discussed above suggest that the recent ICTY and
ICTR decisions regarding rape under international law have moral

210.
Rape Now a War Crime, CBS News, Feb. 22, 2001, at http://www.cbsnews.coml
stories/2001/02/22/world/main273808.shtml.
211.
So far, however, no conviction has occurred without corroborating evidence.
See Rule 96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. SCOR, 23d Plenary Sess. of
the Int'l Crim. Trib. for Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. IT/32/REV:18 (1994), available at
http://www.un.org/ictyfbasic/rpe/IT32_revl8con.htm.
212.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.orglicty/ind-e.htm.
213.
Id.; see also, Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the. Former Yugoslavia, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 255, 288 (2001) (noting how
the ICTY has addressed perceived international legal gender disparities).
214.
Ivkovic, supra note 213, at 288 (quoting Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Radical
Rules: The Effects of Evidential and Procedural Rules on the Regulation of Sexual
Violence in War, 60 ALB. L. REV. 883, 901 (1997)).
215.
Kunarac,Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T.
216.
See Waller, supra note 41, for an opposing view.

20021

THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE UNDER INTERNA TIONAL LAW

1303

and political implications in addition to legal importance. 217 Indeed,
the arguments used to refute the criticisms of Kunarac and Akayesu
also may be used to provide a strong justification both for the
decisions and also for the jurisprudential methods by which they were
obtained. Kunarac, in particular, is justified legally as an extension
of prior international law, including the Akayesu case, regarding war
crimes and crimes against humanity. Additionally, just as Akayesu
rested upon strong moral grounds, Kunarac is also justified morally
because of its condemnation and international criminalization of a
thoroughly repugnant and immoral act. Finally, Kunarac is justified
from a humanistic perspective, for it further establishes standards of
human behavior that should govern even when there is disagreement
and fighting among members of the human community. Indeed, at
their hearts, the Kunarac and Akayesu decisions are about protecting
humanity from further atrocities, and therein may lie their true
importance over time.
A. Justifications
Like Akayesu, the justifications for Kunarac rest on three
principal foundations: international law, conventional morality, and
global respect for humanity. To be sure, all three of these elements
are connected, yet each identifies an element of the tribunals'
decision-making that is necessary to understand the full rationale of
their decisions, including Kunarac.
1. International Law
Prior to the recent decisions by the ICTR and the ICTY, acts of
torture, enslavement and genocide-all of which may encompass
rape-were already considered both war crimes and crimes against
humanity; indeed, prohibitions on these acts had arguably acquired
the status of jus cogens norms from which no derogation by a state
would be permitted. 218 In contrast, the fact that "rape often functions
in ways similar to other human rights abuses makes all the more
striking the fact that, until recently, it has not been condemned like
any other abuse. '' 219 Though it was rarely prosecuted in the past,
rape was considered a criminal act under international law, and the
Akayesu decision reinforced this conclusion by making rape legally

217.
See infra Parts V.A.2.-3. See also Kunarac, Judgment, No. IT-96-23, § IV,
paras. 883-90.
218.
Theodor Meron, International Criminalizationof InternalAtrocities, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 554, 568-71 (1995).
219.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GLOBAL REPORT ON WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS, § 1,

at http://www.hrw.org/about/projects/womrep/General-24.htm.
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tantamount to genocide. 220 Additionally, the prosecution of rape as
both a war crime and as a crime against humanity was expressly
contemplated by the enabling statutes of both the ICTR and the
ICTY.22 1 Thus, the decision in Kunarac represents the culmination of
a series of international legal trends - dating back to at least the
Geneva Conventions and following closely the logic and jurisprudence
of the ICTR in the Akayesu decision - pointing toward the conclusion
that official, systematic rape during an armed conflict is
unequivocally a war crime and a crime against humanity. 22 2 Indeed,
some scholars and many humanitarian organizations such as Human
Rights Watch had already asserted, even before Akayesu and
Kunarac, that "[r]ape is explicitly prohibited under international
humanitarian law governing both international and internal
conflicts. ' 223
Therefore, after Kunarac, there can be no more
confusion or uncertainty regarding whether rape is to be tolerated or
ignored as an act of war. Although Akayesu was, arguably, murky in
its legal analysis of rape as genocide and a crime against humanity,
the decision in Kunarac to make rape a war crime and crime against
humanity is clear and compelling, and its legal justification is without
doubt.
2. Morality
No society condones the physical, nonconsensual sexual violation
of another human being, though sadly, many societies do not
22 4
prosecute or punish such violations as vigorously as they should.
Unlike other crimes that may acquire moral defenses to their
commission (e.g., murder in self-defense; murder as euthanasia; theft
of truly necessary goods), rape is never justifiable because it can
never be a defensive act. 225 Thus, specifically criminalizing rape and
sexual enslavement in the international community recognizes this
fact, and by criminalizing such wholly indefensible behavior,
international legal tribunals raise the moral dignity of all members of

220.
See, e.g., Patricia Viseur Sellers & Kaoru Okuizumi, Intentional
Prosecutionof Sexual Assaults, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 46-47 (1997);
Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993) (noting that individual soldiers have also been convicted in
domestic courts for rape).

221.
222.

ICTY Statute, supra note 53.
McCormack, supra note 36 passim.

223.

GLOBAL REPORT

ON WOMEN'S

HUMAN RIGHTS,

International Protections.
224.
See Meron, supra note 220, at 568.
225.
See Survive, Some Misconceptions
http://survive.org.uk/index1.html#miscon.

and
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that community. 226 Moreover, the decisions in Akayesu and Kunarac
acknowledge that "[r]ape is a moral issue between men and women,
not just between one 'moral monster' and his victim." 22 7 As Akayesu
and Kunarac profess, "[r]ape cannot be properly understood in moral
terms without seeing it as a matter of collective responsibility, not
just an issue of personal responsibility. ' 228 Therefore, international
legal decisions that criminalize rape, such as Akayesu and Kunarac,
do not neglect a moral dimension to international law, for the
foundation of those legal decisions was laid in part by legal principles
229
that embodied moral concerns (i.e., the Geneva Conventions).
3. Respect for Humanity
The recent decisions by the ICTY and the ICTR also provide
guidance for establishing respectful standards for living as humans in
Both Akayesu and Kunarac
an increasingly diverse world.230
reinforce prohibitions on physical violation, racism or ethnic hatred,
and sexism - all of which affect interpersonal interaction within the
23 1
larger community of humans, especially in the developing world.
Moreover, Akayesu acknowledges both human obligations to tolerate
those who are different and the need to recognize similarity as part of
the human community, and the Kunarac decision amplified this sense
of obligation. 232 Acknowledging this sense of humanity, as the ICTY
and ICTR have done, is the first step toward effectuating a change in
international behavior that may one day culminate in the abolition of
diseased acts like the ones that occurred in Rwanda and in BosniaHerzegovina. 233 Indeed, once the human community has attained
this acknowledgement, "[o]nly then can we begin to see a change in
the way the international community, comprised of states
themselves, responds to acts of aggression that violate not only
23 4
human rights laws, but our own sense of morality and decency."

226.
See generally Meron, supra note 220 (noting the "great humanitarian
importance" of criminalizing rape).
227.
Larry May, Editorial, Rape and Collective Responsibility, WASH. U.
EDITORIAL SERVICES., Aug. 1997, at http://news-info.wustl.edulopeds/opeds97/
MayAug97.html.
228.
Id.
See, e.g., Jane Lampman, Morality and War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct.
229.
11, 2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1011/p14s1-lire.html.
230.
See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T,
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
231.
See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM.
J. INT'L L. 239 (2000).
Id.
232.
233.
Siegfried Wiessner and Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence
and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of
Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316 (1999).
234.
Waller, supra note 41, at 658.
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B. Significance
Much was written about the ICTR and the Akayesu case after it
was decided, and much has been written about the trajectory of the
ICTY leading up to the Kunarac decision; 235 however, the academic
community has been much quieter than the popular press since the
Kunarac decision was issued in February 2001, and so far, the
academic analysis of Kunarac has been much less than that of
Akayesu. 236 Part of this academic reticence may stem from the belief
that Kunarac really says nothing new, or from analytic caution in
order to avoid prematurely trying to assert Kunarac's significanceespecially before the Appeals Chamber released its decision in June
2002 regarding the defendants' appeal of their convictions and
sentences. Indeed, the true significance of Kunarac may not be
known for many years, even though the media has already hailed it
as a landmark decision. 237 With more than a year passed for
perspective, however, the impact of Kunarac seems most likely to be
strongest across four separate areas that touch international law.
1. Value for Use by Other Tribunals
Just as Kunarac relied upon ideas developed earlier in Akayesu,
the most immediate impact of Kunarac may be its reference by other
international tribunals faced with adjudicating claims of rape as
either a war crime or a crime against humanity. 238 The enabling
statutes of the ICTR and the ICTY, as well as the Treaty of Rome
creating the International Criminal Court, explicitly consider the
international criminal prosecution of rape; 239 however, the Kunarac

235.
See, e.g., Darren Anne Nebesar, Gender-Based Violence as a Weapon of
War, 4 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147 (1998); Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: GenderBased Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia and the Failure of International Human
Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 793 (1997); Sharon A.
Healey, ProsecutingRape Under the Statute of the War Crimes Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 327, 350 (1995); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of
War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1993).
236.
As of March 2002, only one major piece on Kunarac had been published,
and it focused primarily on Kunarac's implications for war crimes jurisprudence. See
generally Maravella, supra note 169 (discussing the impact of Kunarac on the
prosecution of war crimes under international law).
237.
See, e.g., Barnaby Mason, Rape: A Crime Against Humanity, BBC NEWS,
Feb. 22, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/1184763.stm (hailing the
decision as a "crucial precedent").
238.
See infra text accompanying notes 18-20.
239.
Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human
Dignity, Autonomy and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 625 (2001). But see
Jelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 841
(1997) (arguing that the ICTY provides little, if any, precedential value for the ICC).
Unfortunately, the failure of the United States to join the ICC may overshadow any
other issue that comes before it, including the prosecution of sexual crimes against
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decision provides the most extensive interpretation of those
provisions by presenting a definition of rape for use in international
law. 240 Indeed, rape-and ethnic cleansing in general-has tragically
become a widespread policy for warfare in much of the developing
world, including Peru, Haiti, Myanmar and Somalia, in addition to
the more well-known examples in Rwanda
and BosniaHerzegovina. 241 Consequently, any future prosecutions of mass rapes
in these areas will likely rely on the standard first contemplated in
Akayesu but firmly established in Kunarac.
Admittedly, neither Akayesu, Kunarac, nor any other case
24 2
addresses a persistent problem in international law: enforcement.
Indeed, one reason why international tribunal judgments regarding
rape were so long in coming was not only that rape during war was
243
rarely prosecuted, but also that judgments could not be enforced.
Moreover, the historically inadequate prosecution of rape stands in
24 4
stark contrast to the prosecution of other similarly heinous crimes.
Indeed, this "differential treatment of rape makes clear that the
problem-for the most part-lies not in the absence of adequate legal
prohibitions, but in the international community's willingness to
tolerate sexual abuse against women."245 Therefore, even though
Kunarac may provide a standard for other prosecutions of rape, there
is no guarantee that decisions like Akayesu and Kunarac will
necessarily act as a forceful deterrent to future mass rapes.
Nonetheless, their significance for providing useful international
legal standards regarding an indefensibly heinous crime cannot be
overstated.
2. The Establishment of a Definition of Rape Under International
Law
The ICTY Trial Chamber in Kunarac also adopted a definition of
rape-first discussed in a previous ICTY case, Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, and also explored in the ICTR's Akayesu decision--into

humanity. See, e.g., Glen Kessler, Concerns Over War Crimes Court Not New, WASH.
POST, July 2, 2002, at A9.
240.
See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T, §
V, paras. 439-40
(ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001),
available at
http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm.
241.
See, e.g., Julius Strauss, Sierra Leone's Rebels Use Rape As a Revenge
Weapon, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 2, 2000, LEXIS, News Library, Daitel File.
242. Lucas W. Andrews, Comment, Sailing Around the Flat Earth: The
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a Failure of Jurisprudential

Theory, 11 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 471, 510-13 (1997).
243.

GLOBAL REPORT

International Protections.
244. Id.
245. Id.

ON WOMEN'S

HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 219,

§

1,

1308

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35.1269

customary international law. 246 This definition of the specific crime
of rape was based upon definitions found in the common law of some
of the world's major legal systems including Sweden, Canada,

Germany, and the United Kingdom. 247 To be sure, even after
Akayesu and Kunarac, rape is only an international crime if it occurs
in the context of war or a systematic military campaign; however,
after Kunarac, this crime has a definition, and its future application
may expand beyond that of a situation of armed conflict. 248 In its
Kunaracjudgment, the ICTY presented its definition of rape:
The Chamber must define rape, as there is no commonly accepted
definition of this term in international law. While rape has been
defined in certain national jurisdictions as non-consensual intercourse,
variations on the act of rape may include acts which involve the
insertion of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be
intrinsically sexual. The Chamber considers that rape is a form of
aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be
captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts ....
The
Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances, which are coercive.
Sexual violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances
249
which are coercive.

This definition emphasizes a context of aggression and coercion, and
it allows for the "reformation of the standards of rape prosecution
[which] may also 'assist in the creation of generally accepted
250
international standards on the adjudication of sexual offenses.'
3. Increased Equalization of the Two Genders Before International
Law
As suggested previously,, both the Akayesu and Kunarac
decisions go a long way toward equalizing the status of men and
women under international law. 251 These decisions afford women
almost identical civilian protections as men, and they take almost all
violations of the individual to be unacceptable in times of war.
Furthermore, both decisions apply equally to men and women;

246.
See American Society of International Law, ICTY: Prosecutor v.
Furundzija,IT-95-17/1-T (Dec. 10, 1998), in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN BRIEF (Dec. 21-25,
1998), available at http://www.asil.org/ilib/ilibarch.htm; see Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Judgment, No. ICTR-96-4-T (Int'l Criminal Trib. for Rwanda, Sept. 2, 1998), available
at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akayOOl.htm.
247.
See generally Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-9623/1-T, § IV, para. 439 (ICTY, Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/inde.htm.
248.
See Kunarac,Judgment, Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T.
249.
See generally id. § V, paras. 596-98.
250.
Ivkovic, supra note 213, at 287.
251.
See infra Part IV.D.
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indeed, some men were also sexually assaulted during the armed
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 252 Moreover, they condemn in very
strong language any official policy of a government or military
apparatus that condones, encourages, or supports a campaign of mass
sexual violation, including rape or sexual enslavement; indeed, both
Akayesu and Kunarac were government agents who had the power to
protect people from these acts, and the ICTR and the ICTY made
clear that their failure to exercise this power was a gross violation of
their duties as government agents. These decisions, however, do not
single out women as a weaker class of victims in need of special
protection; rather, they bring women more fully into the larger class
of human beings who are afforded all legal, moral and humanistic
253
protections.
4. The Establishment of an Inviolable Jus Cogens Principle Against
Rape
Jus cogens norms in international law are notoriously difficult to
identify, and because of their absolute, nonderogative character, there
is no general consensus that norms or principles should be labeled as
jus cogens. 25 4 Prohibitions against piracy, slavery, and genocide are
among principles most commonly asserted as jus cogens norms, and
over time a prohibition on rape may also be included. Indeed, one
may argue that rape is already included under jus cogens prohibitions
against genocide and slavery. To be sure, the Akayesu and Kunarac
decisions do not explicitly place rape into this category, but they
present an extremely strong argument regarding why a prohibition
on rape should be such a norm. Indeed, the reasoning in Akayesu and
Kunarac leaves little room for the argument that prohibiting rape
should not be treated as a jus cogens principle. Moreover, because
rape is inherently an indefensible act, these decisions would force one
to make an inhumane, almost barbaric argument regarding why rape
should not be expressly prohibited in all situations.

252.
Men were also victimized by sexual violence, including sexual mutilation
and forced rape, during the Yugoslavian conflict; therefore, these decisions protect
them just as much as they protect women. See Askin, supra note 14, at 102 (detailing
the incidents of sexual violence directed against men).
See, e.g., Askin, supra note 14, at 97; Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist
253.
Methods in InternationalLaw, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 379 (1999). But see Waller, supra
note 41 (arguing that the ICTY's current limited role in stopping gender-based human
rights violations makes it an inadequate tool for such goals).
See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.D.C.
254.
1994) (defining a jus cogens norm as "a principle of international law that is 'accepted
by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted"') (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 940 (D.D.C. 1988)).
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VI. CONCLUSION

Kunarac's expansion of the definition of a crime against
humanity is logical, moral, and humane, and follows closely from the
example set by the ICTR in Akayesu in which rape is condemned as
genocidal. It goes beyond Akayesu, however, in its establishment of a
useful international legal definition of rape, its clear condemnation of
rape as both a war crime and a crime against humanity, and its
detailed analysis of the law underlying its holdings. Contrary to the
arguments of some, classifying rape or enslavement as a crime
against humanity does not violate international laws and norms of
sovereignty, nor does it reinforce old stereotypes of women as a
weaker sex in need of rescue. Rather, it leads to an opposite
conclusion, namely that women now possess truly equal legal
standing with men in the human community as both men and women
are shielded from personal sexual violations like those that occurred
in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the Kunarac and
Akayesu decisions closed outdated gaps in existing international law,
established useful foundations for future prosecutions of crimes
against humanity, and created important legal bulwarks for civilians
against ethnic, gender and other difference-motivated crimes
committed by a state or a state-sponsored group. In fact, these
decisions may even change how war is conducted in the future, for
they will almost certainly impact the newly-established International
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Criminal Court's view of crimes against humanity.
To be sure, rape will most likely still be used by military
combatants, especially as an instrument to effectuate goals of ethnic
cleansing within a desired territory. Rape has been a common policy
in warfare throughout history, particularly in armed conflicts within
developing countries, and its use as a tool of war shows little sign of
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receding even in light of cases such as Kunarac and Akayesu.
Indeed, rape has played a large role in recent military conflicts in
Peru, Myanmar, Haiti, Kashmir, and Somalia, in addition to the
aforementioned examples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, and
its frequency is almost as disturbing as its apparent acceptance as a
method for achieving military and political power. Its corrosive
power, however, cannot be overstated, and as Catharine MacKinnon
has noted in her discussion of genocidal rape, the use of rape in a
military conflict is particularly insidious:
[The use of rape in the conflict in Yugoslavia] is ethnic rape as an
official policy of war in a genocidal campaign for political control. That
means not only a policy of the pleasure of male power unleashed, which
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happens all the time in so-called peace; not only a policy to defile,
torture, humiliate, degrade, and demoralize the other side, which
happens all the time in war; and not only a policy of men posturing to
gain advantage and ground over other men. It is specifically rape
under orders. This is not rape out of control. It is rape under control.
It is also rape unto death, rape as massacre, rape to kill and to make
the victims wish they were dead. It is rape as an instrument of forced
exile, rape to make you leave your home and never want to go back. It
is rape to be seen and heard and watched and told to others: rape as
spectacle. It is rape to drive a wedge through a community, to shatter a
257
society, to destroy a people.

The decisions in Akayesu and Kunarac cannot prevent such acts in
and of themselves, but they are important first steps toward the
prevention of such acts in the future.
James R. McHenry III*

257.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape, Genocide, and Women's Human Rights, 17
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 5, 11-12 (1994).
* J.D./Ph.D. Candidate 2003, Vanderbilt University; BSFS 1997, Georgetown
University. I wish to thank Brooke Ackerly and W. James Booth for their thoughts on
issues addressed in this note. I also wish to thank Olga McHenry, Morgan and Edith
McHenry, Prateek Goorha, Jennifer Hoef, Wolfgang Moehler, Karen Petersen, and
Carol Swain for their support while I wrote this note. This note is dedicated to the
efforts to bring justice to people everywhere who have been victimized by crimes
against humanity. Salus populi suprema lex (The welfare of the people is the highest
law.). ©James R. McHenry III.

k -'x"J¢
•

